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Signaling currency crises in South Africa 
Abstract 
Currency crises episodes of 1996, 1998, and 2001 are used to identify common country 
specific causes of currency crises in South Africa. The paper identifies crises by the use 
of an Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index as introduced by Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996). It extends the Signals Approach introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996, 1998) by developing a composite indicator in order to measure the evolution of 
currency crisis risk in South Africa. The analysis considers the standard suspects from 
international currency crises and country specifics as identified by the Myburgh Com-
mission (2002) and current literature as potentially relevant indicators. 
Keywords: signals approach, currency crises, South Africa 
JEL classification: E5, F3, G1 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Arbeit betrachtet die südafrikanischen Währungskrisenepisoden von 1996, 1998 
und 2001, um gemeinsame länderspezifische Ursachen für Währungskrisen in Südafrika 
zu ermitteln. Die Identifikation der Währungskrisen erfolgt mittels des Exchange Mar-
ket Pressure Indexes, welcher von Eichengreen, Rose und Wyplosz (1996) entwickelt 
wurde. Dann wird ein Signalansatz, basierend auf Kaminsky und Reinhart (1996, 1998) 
verwendet, um mit dessen Hilfe das Risiko für Währungskrisen in Südafrika zu evaluie-
ren. Die Arbeit berücksichtigt als potentielle Einflussgrößen die üblichen Variablen aus 
der Währungskrisentheorie sowie länderspezifische Faktoren, welche sich aus dem Be-
richt der Myburgh Commission (2002) und aktueller Literatur ergeben. 
Schlagworte: Signalansatz, Währungskrisen, Südafrika  
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1  Introduction 
As most of the emerging market economies, South Africa is facing turbulences on for-
eign exchange markets, which appear in form of high volatility in prices of its domestic 
currency, the South African rand. The increased volatility of exchange rates in emerging 
markets is usually attributed to the smaller size of their economies and consequently the 
smaller size of the market for their currency. Under these conditions transactions have a 
greater impact on exchange rates than in larger and more mature economies. Addition-
ally, a generally higher risk of investment projects and the macroeconomic, as well as 
political, stability are recognized as reasons for a higher variance in currency markets. 
Higher exchange rate volatility in emerging market countries is therefore a comprehen-
sible expectation and reflects fundamental differences in the structure of economies. 
However, if exchange rate volatility increases drastically it can evolve into a currency 
crisis, which results in significant depreciation of the domestic currency. These depre-
ciation episodes are often accompanied by interventions of central banks by raising in-
terest rates and buying domestic currency with their foreign exchange reserves. If inter-
ventions  are  not  successful,  currency  crises  may  cause  microeconomic  distortions 
mainly in the financial sector but also in the import and foreign finance dependent sec-
tors of the economy. On a macroeconomic level currency crises may result in instability 
of further aggregates such as the domestic price level and also lower economic growth. 
Furthermore, the costliness of exchange rate interventions is one of the reasons why a 
number of central banks, including the South African Reserve Bank since 2000, opt 
against regular intervention on foreign exchange markets and rather take the crises as 
given evil. 
In any case, central banks and the private sector are dependent on evaluating the future 
risk of currency crises in order to prepare policy measures or to either hedge or stay 
away from certain types of transactions. The literature describes different concepts of 
how to signal or forecast currency crises. One line of concepts are signals approaches 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996, 1998). This paper employs such a signals approach for 
the case of South Africa in order to inquire into country specific determinants of cur-
rency crises. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section the defini-
tion  of  currency  crises  is  discussed  resulting  in  the  identification  of  an  appropriate 
measure of currency crises. The third section aims at identifying currency crises in South 
Africa. The fourth section introduces the concept of the signals approach. The fifth sec-
tion employs the signals approach to the South African case. The sixth section con-
cludes.  
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2  Identifying currency crises – A literature review 
Broad definitions of currency crises include one common element: the significant loss of 
value of the domestic currency.1 The event of significant depreciation or devaluation of 
a currency is called a crisis since it has been shown that such an event may trigger mi-
croeconomic distortions resulting in financial or banking crises. This could cause mac-
roeconomic aggregates to be negatively affected, e.g. by higher inflation rates or lower 
economic growth. Consequently some authors use a certain percentage fluctuation in the 
value of a currency within a certain time period as the indicator of a currency crisis. For 
instance Brüggemann and Linne (2002) define a 20 percent depreciation within ten trad-
ing days as a currency crisis. 
Not only the actual depreciation or devaluation of a currency can be associated with 
economic losses, but also efforts to avoid or stop the fall of the currency can be costly. 
Therefore, most definitions of currency crises also include interventions by the respec-
tive central banks. These interventions can take the form of increases in interest rates – 
in order to make the domestic currency more attractive to investors – and interventions 
in foreign exchange markets – in order to stabilize the demand for the domestic currency 
to avoid price reactions.2 All three measures are combined in the Exchange Market 
Pressure (EMP) index. A general expression of the EMP index is:3 
, , , , i t i t i t i t EMP e i r a b g = ×D + ×D + ×D   (1) 
The EMP is the weighted sum of the percentage change in the exchange rate of country i 
at time t ( , i t e D ), changes in interest rates ( , i t i D ) and the percentage change in foreign ex-
change reserves ( , i t r D ).  , , a b g  are the weights of the respective measures. The signs of 
the measures are adjusted so that an increase of the measure indicates increasing pres-




t i EMP EMP EMP
CRISIS
m d s > + × 
= 

  (2) 
A crisis is indicated if the current value of the EMP index exceeds the mean of the EMP 
time series ( EMP m ) plus the standard deviation of the EMP time series ( EMP s ) multiplied 
by a weight (d ). 
                                                 
1  Compare Angkinand, Li, Willett (2006), Calvo, Reinhart (1999: 26), Gerber (2002, p. 264).  
2  Kaminsky, Reinhart (1996, p. 4), Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz (1996, pp. 474-475). 
3  Compare Bhundia, Ricci (2005, p. 157)  
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While the empirical literature on currency crises widely uses this general framework, it 
differs notably on the details of EMP definition and the crisis threshold. With respect to 
equation (1), there are versions of the equation that use changes in the interest rate dif-
ferential to a reference country instead of changes in domestic interest rates alone. There 
are also variations in which changes of currency reserves relative to monetary aggre-
gates are used instead of foreign currency reserves of the country of interest itself.4 Most 
importantly, differences lie in the calculation of the weights  , , a b g . Some studies set 
one or two of the weights equal to zero. It is sometimes argued that adequate interest 
rate data is not available for emerging market economies and b  is therefore set at zero.5 
In other studies it has been argued that interventions in foreign exchange markets play a 
minor role, e.g. because a central bank opts not to intervene in currency markets or be-
cause reserves fluctuate too much in non-crisis times due to other reasons which overlay 
the currency crisis effect, therefore g  is set at zero.6 One rather common way of tack-
ling the weighting problem is to weight the (remaining) measures according to their in-
verse standard deviations. The so-calculated weights can be normalized to sum up to 
unity if each weight is divided by the sum of the inverse standard deviations of all 










  (3). 
This means that a large variance of one measure would result in a lower weight of this 
measure compared to the other measures entering the EMP equation. The calculation of 
this so-called precision weights is disputed in the literature, especially because of the 
understatement of unsuccessful speculation against fixed exchange rates and an over-
statement  of  successful  speculation  (high  weights  on  the  fixed  exchange  rate,  low 
weights on the volatile reserves).8 If the fluctuation of exchange rates would be close to 
zero, the relative weight of reserves would also be closed to zero. 
With regard to the crisis threshold, equation (2), there are also wide differences in its 
use in literature. While the general framework is used in most studies, the differences lie 
in the weight (d ) of the standard deviation of the EMP index that spans a value range of 
                                                 
4  See Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz (1996, p. 457), Girton, Roper (1997).  
5  E.g. Aziz, Caramazza, Salgado (2000), Kaminsky, Reinhart (1999), Glick, Hutchison (2001). Most 
of the citations in this section are adopted from Angkinand, Li, Willett (2006), who provide an excel-
lent overview over different EMP variations. 
6  E.g. Bubula, Otker-Robe (2003). 
7  See Angkinand, Li, Willett (2006). 
8  See Angkinand, Li, Willett (2006), Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz (1995).  
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1.5 in some studies to 3.0 in others.9 Obviously this may have an effect on calling an 
event a crisis. Besides the above mentioned use of changes in exchange rates as crises 
indicator there are also authors which use a combination of the EMP based crises indica-
tion and an exchange rate measure. Thus a crisis is called a crisis if equation (2) is ful-
filled and if the exchange rate depreciated by a certain percentage change over some 
time.10 
Acknowledging the various types of crises identification frameworks, the following sec-
tion employs different versions in order to confirm the existence of South African cur-
rency crises seen in the literature and to evaluate their robustness to changes in the type 
of the framework. 
                                                 
9  “1.5” is used in Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz (1996, p. 475); IMF (1998), Aziz, Caramazza, Salgado 
(2000); Ahluwalia (2000); Bordo et al. (2001). “1.645” is used in Caramazza, Ricci, Salgado (2000); 
Bhundia, Ricci (2005). “1.7” is used by Kamin, Schindler, Samuel (2001). “2.0” is used in Eichen-
green, Rose, Wyplosz (1994); Glick, Hutchinson (2001). “2.5” is used Edison (2000). “3.0” is used 
by Kaminsky, Reinhart (1999); Berg, Patillo (1999a); Bubula, Otker-Robe (2003). More detailed 
surveys can be found in Angkinand, Li, Willett (2006) and Abiad (2003). 
10  E.g. Moreno (2000, p. 12) uses the additional criterion of 25 percent annual depreciation.  
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3  Identifying currency crises in South Africa 
The literature identifies various currency crises in the recent past of South Africa. Bhun-
dia and Ricci (2005: 156) identify currency crises between the end of April and the end 
of August 1998 and also between the end of September and the end of December 2001. 
Aron and Muellbauer (2000: 19-20) identify currency crises in February 1996 (the first 
South African currency crisis), in October 1996, November 1997 and April 1998. Inter-
estingly enough, Aron and Muellbauer (2005) do not call the 2001 “event” a currency 
crisis (see Box 1). 
Box 1:  
Events commonly referred to as currency crises in South Africa 
February-April 1996: South Africa was confronted with large capital inflows after the 
successful elections in 1994. The Reserve Bank was following a dual strategy: an interest 
rate policy based on monetary targets and a nominal exchange rate stabilization policy. 
The unsterilized interventions to avoid appreciation in 1994 resulted in monetary expan-
sion. This lead to inflationary pressure in 1995. Additionally, the liberalization policy 
(also with regard to exchange controls) along with the end of international sanctions re-
sulted in concerns about the increase of the current account deficit, rising inflation and in-
creasing public debt at the end of 1995. The depreciation episode started in mid-February 
1996, accumulating to 20 percent by April 1996. The Reserve Bank intervened heavily in 
the spot and forward markets to counteract the depreciation.11 
April-August 1998: During 1997 South Africa saw capital inflows due to a large interest 
rate differential to the US and a slow appreciation process. The crisis started in the second 
quarter 1998 when funds were moving out of emerging markets in reaction to currency 
crises in Russia and Asia. The interventions of the Reserve Bank in the forward markets 
lead to arbitrary profits by borrowing Rand, turn them into US$, buying US assets and 
hedge the transaction on forward markets. This increased the depreciative pressure on the 
spot rate. Heavy interventions and interest rate increases could not prevent a depreciation 
of 34 percent by July 1998. The Reserve Bank stopped interventions, which resulted in 
further depreciation.12 
September-December 2001: Between September and end of December 2001 the Rand 
depreciated by 26 percent. The Reserve Bank did not intervene in favor of the Rand. Po-
tential explanations of the depreciation are for example the acceleration in money growth 
in 2001, the delay of the privatization of the telecom service provider, the continued pol-
icy of drawing down the net open forward position of the Reserve Bank (intervention 
against the domestic currency), Reserve Banks announcements to tighten the enforcement 
of exchange controls in October, contagion from political and social trouble in Zimbabwe, 
and a crisis in Argentina.13  
                                                 
11  Source: Aron, Muellbauer (2000, pp. 16-17). 
12  Source: Schaling, Schoeman (2000, pp. 2-5). 
13  Source: Bhundia, Ricci (2005, pp. 156-165).  
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Source: SARB (2006), own calculations.  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 19/2006  11
In order to capture all potential currency crises in South Africa the analysis considers 
monthly data of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) beginning at 1993/1 to the lat-
est available data, 2006/5. The time series include in particular “rand cent per US$” 
(KBP5339M)  which  will  be  called  exchange  rate  in  this  paper,  “discount  rates  on 
91days treasury bills” (KBP1405W) called interest rates and the “international liquidity 
position” or “net reserves” (KBP5277M) called reserves. Since the interest rate measure 
is only available on a weekly basis, the monthly average is calculated. Figure 1 shows 
the percentage changes in the exchange rate (a positive sign indicates a depreciation), 
the change in interest rates (a positive sign indicates an increase in interest rates) and the 
change in reserves (a positive sign indicates decreasing reserves). Note that in contrast 
to the above-described framework it is not possible to use percentage changes of re-
serves, since the data (the net reserves) is not rationally scaled (i.e. the time series has no 
definite zero point). It seems however appropriate to use net reserves in the South Afri-
can case because of the considerable past open forward position.14 
Using the concept of inverse standard deviations as weights for the components of the 
EMP, including all three components, yields the EMP time series as shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2: 






























































































































































Source: own calculations based on SARB (2006). 
                                                 
14  See e.g. Bhundia, Ricci (2005, p. 157).  
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Higher values of the EMP index indicate higher exchange market pressure. In order to 
identify crises periods a definition of the crises threshold is needed. Figure 3 shows two 
versions of crises thresholds used in the literature (more can be found in the table in the 
appendix). The figure shows the values of the EMP index in each year and the different 
threshold interval. All data points whose threshold-intervals lie completely above the zero 
line are called crises months (indicated by a black dot). In all cases the thresholds consist 
of the mean of the times series plus a varying multiple of the standard deviation (s ). 
Figure 3: 




















































































































































































































































































































































Source: own calculation based on SARB (2006).  
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Figure 3 shows that indicated crises months decline with the increasing threshold. While 
in circumstances where the threshold is set at the mean of the EMP time series plus 
1.645  times  the  standard  deviation  indicates  seven  crises  months,  namely April  and 
March 1996, May to August 1998, and December 2001. The increase of the threshold to 
3.0 times the standard deviation leads to “losing” March 1996, August 1998, and De-
cember 2001 as crises months. 
Using a 25 percent annual depreciation of the exchange rate as an additional condition 
for currency crises, the crisis months would diminish to July and August 1998 and De-
cember 2001; furthermore 1996 would not be a crisis year any more. If the strict rule of 
25 percent annual depreciation is combined with the “three sigma”-threshold condition, 
only one month is identified as a crisis month during the period of observation: July 
1998. Table 1 shows the depreciation of the exchange rate in percent of the pre-years 
value for the above identified potential crises months. 
Table 1: 
Annual depreciation of the rand/US$ exchange rate in selected months 
Potential crises month  1996/4  1996/5  1998/5  1998/6  1998/7  1998/8  2001/12 
Depreciation  16.8%  23.6%  14.0%  19.2%  37.0%  35.0%  51.2% 
Source: SARB (2006), own calculations. 
The above stated shortcomings concerning the precision weights for measuring currency 
crises in the case of fixed exchange rates can be translated into the South African case. 
In this case it can be criticized that the more current crises, namely in the period after the 
decision of the treasury and the SARB in 2000 not to intervene in the case of speculative 
pressure on the rand, may lead to an underestimation of currency crises. This can be ex-
pected because these later crises are supposed to just affect the exchange rate and not the 
policy instruments of interest rates and reserves.15 Thus, if interest rates and reserves 
used to be relatively stable, their weight in the EMP may be relatively high. Since inter-
est rates and reserves are not responding to exchange rate developments, their variations 
may overlay depreciation episodes which would have otherwise be called currency cri-
ses. However, interest rates may not be adjusted to counteract speculative pressure but 
may be adjusted to avoid rising inflation due to increasing import prices. Thus, a for-
ward-looking monetary policy-maker may still react in the case of expected depreciation 
of the rand by increasing interest rates. Thus, it seems to be appropriate to calculate two 
other versions of the EMP, one setting the weight on reserves (g ) to zero and another 
                                                 
15  South Africa saw a change in the exchange rate policy from exchange rate smoothing between the 
times of SARB governors Stals (1999) and the introduction of an inflation targeting regime in 2000 
(Mboweni 2000). In 2001 governor Mboweni (2001) noted with regard to exchange rate volatility: 
„... we have to live with it – sit tight, grit out teeth and suffer in silence“.  
IWH  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 19/2006  14
setting the weights of reserves and interest rates ( , b g ) to zero. Figure 4 shows the case 
of an EMP just consisting of percent changes in the exchange rate. 
Figure 4: 
EMP,  , 0 b g = , 1.645 sigma threshold 




































































































































































Source: own calculations based on SARB (2006). 
With this measure seven crises months are identified, which are however not in all cases 
identical with the above identified ones. The crisis months similar to the above analysis 
are April 1996, July 1998, December 2001, i.e. all major crises are indicated by this 
method as well, though the crisis duration is shorter. Additionally the method indicates 
crises in May 2000, October 2001, January 2004, and June 2005. It is not surprising that 
more crises are indicated for the last couple of years because of the above-mentioned 
change in policy. This version of the EMP index, including the exchange rate, can be 
employed using different thresholds. The results can be seen in the Annex. Two crises 
months are left using the highest threshold of three times sigma plus the mean, which 
are July 1998 (again) and December 2001. Figure 5 shows the case where just (g ), the 
weight on reserves is set zero. 
The premise saying that interest rates may indicate current events as being in crises, 
since they may not react to the exchange rate developments but to expected inflation 
could not be confirmed. The so-constructed EMP indicates well-known months as crises 
months. The only exception is May 1996, which is indicated as a crisis month here and  
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has not been identified as such before. This may be due to a late reaction of interest rates 
responding to inflationary pressure in the aftermath of the March/April crisis of 1996. 
Figure 5: 
EMP  0 g = , 1,645 sigma threshold 




































































































































































Source: own calculations based on SARB (2006). 
Crises during the times of the interventionist approach of the SARB may not have re-
sulted in large changes in the exchange rate but may have been covered by interventions 
in foreign exchange markets. To detect them figure 6 shows an EMP index including 
just reserves. 
As expected the so-detected currency crisis months are concentrated in the first part of 
the sample. The picture shows that there have been crisis-significant interventions in 
March, July and August 1994, which were not followed by significant depreciations and 
have  therefore  not  been  detected  by  the  broader  EMP  approaches.  However,  these 
months are not called a crisis if the threshold is increased to 2.5 times sigma (as can be 
seen from the table in the appendix). In 1996 there have been interventions during April 
(a month already detected as a crisis month) and October, a month so far seen as a point 
after the 1996 crisis. The indications in 1998 are again in line with what has already 
been detected. After June 1998 no significant intervention could be observed. 
Using  the 25 percent annual depreciation criterion as an additional condition for an 
event to be called a currency crisis, the respective months are marked by an exclamation 
mark in the annex. Of the, so far, detected potential crises months, October 1996, July  
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and August 1998, as well as December 2001 show depreciations of the exchange rate of 
above 25 percent compared to the pre-year month. 
Figure 6: 
EMP,  , 0 a b = , 1.645 sigma threshold 


































































































































































Source: own calculations based on SARB (2006). 
As a final measure for determining currency crises the simple method of requiring a cer-
tain current depreciation of the exchange rate is used. Brüggemann & Linne (2002) use 
the criterion of 20 percent depreciation within ten trading days. According to this crite-
rion only one day during the period of observation would be called a crisis: 20
th of De-
cember 2001, 21.30 percent.16 
To sum up, the results drawn from the different currency crisis identification frame-
works depicted in the table in the appendix show that there is just one crisis month, in-
dicated as such by all versions of the EMP, and that is April 1996. This month, however, 
is not detected as a crisis month with use of all the thresholds. April 1996 is surrounded 
by two months that show some indications for crises. Also in October there have been 
significant interventions due to ongoing depreciation. Other prominent months are May 
and June 1998 (not detected by the EMP including exchange rates only) and July 1998 
(not detected by the EMP with including reserves only) as well as December 2001 (ob-
                                                 
16  The daily exchange rate data is provided by Datastream.  
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viously not detectable by the EMP including reserves only). The 1998 event is centered 
on June and July but surrounded by two months that show some indication for currency 
crises. In 2001 the episode focuses very much on December with some indications in 
October. The three events of April 1996, June/July 1998 and December 2001 can, with 
the backing of the above analysis, be called currency crises. 
It is somewhat more questionable whether the 1994, the 2000, 2004, and 2005 episodes 
can be called crises. The 1994 event shows some depreciation, which is low compared 
to the 1996, 1998, and 2001 events. Interest rates had been rising as well, but the in-
creases of up to 1.1 percent points have been relatively low. Only the reserves measure 
shows a severe reaction of the Reserve Bank with changes in reserves of above what we 
observed e.g. in August 1998. The impression from these figures is that the reaction of 
the Reserve Bank has been successful in order to prevent a more serious depreciation 
and therefore a currency crisis. The successfully held elections in 1994 may have added 
to the stop of the depreciation episode. The episodes of 2000, 2004, and 2005 are more 
difficult to evaluate. The main concern is the policy switch, which can clearly be seen at 
the reserves chart in figure 1. After the 1998 crisis there have been no interventions by 
the SARB that came close to the previously seen figures. As stated above, the SARB 
opted against intervention in currency markets further on. Figure 7 shows an EMP index 
including exchange rates, interest rates and reserves calculated with data from 1998/12 
onwards. 
The figure shows that limitation of the sample period leads to two newly detected crisis 
months  using  the  EMP  index  including  all  three  measures:  April  2000  and  January 
2004. When taking out the more extreme events of the 1990s the chart leads to an iden-
tification of events as crises that were formerly hidden by those events. However, the 
second chart of figure 7 shows that the increased volatility in exchange rates (see also 
figure 1) leads to fewer detected crises by the exchange rate alone EMP as compared to 
figure 4 (the 2004 event is not detected as crisis here). What is also evident from the 
above figures is that May 2006, the last dot in the charts, is not identified as currency 
crises month even though it was discussed as being a serious event (the June 2006 data 
is still not available at the time of writing). 
It can be concluded that for no post-1998 event, except for the episode in 2001, there 
has been enough evidence for it to be called a currency crisis. In the following sections 
the events of 1996, 1998 and 2001 are considered as currency crises. The remainder of 
this section discusses shortcomings and criticisms of detecting currency crises by the 
methods employed above.  
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Figure 7: 
EMP (1998/12 to 2006/5) 1.645 sigma threshold 
























































































































































































































































































Source: own calculations based on (SARB 2006). 
If it is assumed that the data points of the time series can be described as normally dis-
tributed, the calculation of crises thresholds will almost certainly lead to the identifica-
tion of some events as currency crises, depending on the heights of the threshold. The 
version prominently used in the graphical analysis above was a threshold of the mean of  
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the time series plus 1.645 its standard deviation. That threshold is used, in line with e.g. 
Bhundia and Ricci (2005: 157) and Caramazza et al. (2000), because it will identify five 
percent of the months as crises months (outlying of a one-sided 95 percent confidence 
interval) if the time series is normally distributed. Obviously discrete changes in the 
threshold lead to more, or less, detected crises. It is also for that reason that the crisis 
identification by this measure is largely method dependent. As seen above, the crisis de-
tection is also dependent on the sample period and the weights of the three measures in 
the index. Additional conditions, such as an additional annual depreciation criterion, 
counteract the potential identification of crises in periods where there have not been any 
serious events. However, depending on the threshold of this criterion, more or less crises 
are identified and the criterion may let crises, in which the depreciation has been held in 
check by interventions in money or foreign exchange markets undetected. Thus, the 
technical analysis of EMP index figures cannot be a substitute for careful economic 
analysis of events. It may also be worthwhile to look at the impact of episodes on cur-
rency  markets  on  other  macroeconomic  aggregates  such  as  inflation  and  economic 
growth, which may be closer to economic wealth and can therefore be a better indicator 
of a certain events being a crisis or not. 
The results of the analysis above are still used in the remainder of the paper, since the find-
ings are in line with what has already been detected as currency crises in the literature.  
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4  Signaling currency crises – a literature review 
The theoretical literature on currency crises is centered on the paradigm of the three 
generations of currency crises models. The first generation, owed to Krugman (1979) 
and Flood & Garber (1984), described currency crises as speculative attacks which re-
sult from monetary or fiscal policies that were not in line with a fixed exchange rate tar-
get. The run on foreign currency reserves occurred because market participants could 
foresee the depreciation and tried to avoid losses. The models described the currency 
crises  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  in  Latin  America.  The  second  generation,  based  on 
Obstfeld (1986), stresses the trade-off between the central banks intentions to target a 
fixed exchange rate and to follow other policy targets, e.g. to achieve low levels of un-
employment. If speculators assume that the policy response could be devaluation, the 
event may become self-fulfilling without (in contrast to first generation models) worsen-
ing  economic  fundamentals.  The  models  addressed,  for  example, the EMS crises in 
Europe. Third generation models stress the connection between banking and currency 
crises, and address problems such as contagion of crises and herd effects. These models 
were developed in response to the Asian crises of 1997/1998. 
The empirical literature on signaling or forecasting currency crises is based on the the-
ory transmission processes described above, but approaches vary with regard to the em-
ployed techniques. Standard approaches are bivariate Logit/Probit-models and signals 
approaches as developed by Kaminsky & Reinhart (1996, 1998).17 Logit/Probit-models 
use the bivariate variable crisis/no crisis as endogenous variable and estimate the impact 
of different sets of explanatory variables.18 Signals approaches are non-parametric ap-
proaches that examine the behavior of potential explanatory variables prior to the de-
tected crises and compare it with non-crises periods. If some of the variables pass a cer-
tain threshold their changes are used as crisis signals.19 Besides these two techniques, 
further concepts are outlined in the literature. These include artificial neural networks 
(ANN),  whose  advantage  is  the  reflection  of  complex  interaction  between  the  vari-
ables;20 value-at-risk models, exposing several factors of risk to the ability of central 
                                                 
17  For a more detailed survey on Early-Warning Systems presented in this section see Abiad (2003).  
18  Examples include Berg, Pattillo (1999b); Kamin, Schindler, Samuel (2001), and Kumar, Moorthy, 
Perraudin (2002). 
19  See Brüggemann, Linne (2002). Other examples include Berg, Pattillo (1999b), and Edison (2000). 
20 E.g. Nag, Mitra (1999); Peltonen (2006).  
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banks  to  target  a  fixed  exchange  rate;21  restricted  VAR  models;22  and  Markov-
switching approaches, which do not depend on an a priori definition of crises.23 
This paper largely follows the signals approach as developed by Brüggemann & Linne 
(2002), which is generally based upon Kaminsky & Reinhart (1996, 1998). The signals 
approach is used, because of its simple applicability and because it was found to outper-
form alternatives.24 The remainder of this section is devoted to the used method, which 
is used in the subsequent section to calculate the country specific currency crisis signals 
in South Africa. 
The first step in employing a signals approach is to define currency crises in the period 
of observation. This has been undertaken in the previous section. The second step is to 
identify  potential  explanatory  variables,  which  may  send signals for currency crises. 
These variables should be derived from theories about currency crises. Variables, which 
may have an influence on the occurrence of currency crises in South Africa, are identi-
fied in the next section. The third step is to generate appropriate time series, as well as 
to decide on a sample period and data frequency. The fourth step is to decide on the cri-
ses window, i.e. the time prior to a crisis in which the variables are expected to send 
their signals. The literature uses different sample periods and data frequencies; most 
common  are  sample  periods  starting  in  the  1980s  or  1990s  and  monthly  data  fre-
quency.25 The time-window spans from 18 months to 24 months.26 
The fifth step is to calculate individual crisis thresholds for each variable, which cuts 
tranquil periods from crises periods. The difficulty lies in the problem that the threshold 
should neither be too high (and probably not detecting crises) nor too low (and probably 











  (4) 
                                                 
21  E.g. Blejer, Schumacher (1998). 
22  E.g. Krkoska (2001). 
23  E.g. Abidad (2003). The author provides further examples of techniques of Early warning systems.  
24  Abidad (2003, p. 3). 
25  Abidad (2003, p. 9). 
26  See for example Brüggemann, Linne (2002, p. 9), and Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1998, p. 17) re-
spectively. 
27  See Brüggemann, Linne (2002, p. 10).  
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Whereby A is the number of months a good signal was sent (a crisis is correctly sig-
naled), B is the number of months a false alarm signal was sent, C is the number of 
months in which no signal was sent but a crises followed, D is the number of months in 
which no signal was sent and no crises followed. In other words, the noise-to-signal ra-
tio is the ratio between false alarms as part of non-crises followed months and good sig-
nals as part of crises followed months. The noise-to-signal ratio is calculated with dif-
ferent crisis thresholds ranging from 5 to 30 percent or 70 to 95 percent of the distribu-
tion, depending on the expected impact of the variable, for each measure. The thresholds 
yielding the best-fit or lowest noise-to-signal ratios are used in the further calculation of 
the signals approach. Indicators which produce more false alarms than good signals, i.e. 
those having a noise-to-signal ratio of above one, are excluded from further analysis. 
The sixth step is the calculation of a composite indicator. Following Brüggemann & 
Linne (2002) the signals approach is extended by introducing a second threshold in or-
der to discriminate weak from strong signals, and by considering the timing of a signal 
(i.e. more current signals are higher weighted in the composite indicator). The weighting 
of the single indicators according to their prognostic quality is in line with standard lit-
erature. 
The three stages of calculation are conducted by first calculating the second threshold, 
which is done by halving the percentile of the frequency distribution which was calcu-
lated for the first threshold. If a single indicator remains below its first threshold it takes 
the value of zero, if it passes the first threshold its value is defined as one, if it passes the 
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Third, these so-calculated Z-signals of each variable are combined by accounting for their 
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The procedure yields a composite indicator of currency crises.  
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5  Signaling currency crises in South Africa 
As derived above, April 1996, June/July 1998 and December 2001 are considered as cri-
ses months. A set of variables in the style of those that have been found to be useful in 
signaling  currency  crises  in  previous  studies  as  extracted  by  Brüggemann  &  Linne 
(2002) are used. These variables include: (1) growth of industrial production, (2) the ra-
tio of budget deficits to GDP, (3) the appreciation of the real exchange rate, (4) the 
change in the international liquidity position, (5) growth rate of merchandise exports, (6) 
growth rate of merchandise imports, (7) growth rate of ratio of domestic credit to GDP, 
(8) the growth rate of the ratio of M2 to currency reserves, (9) the domestic interest rate, 
(10) the interest rate differential to the US, (11) growth rate of bank deposits of indi-
viduals, (12) growth rate of foreign debt of the government, (13) the ratio of lending 
rates to deposit rates. The Commission of Inquiry into the rapid depreciation of the ex-
change rate of the rand and related matters, the so-called Myburgh Commission (2002), 
was officially established to investigate the 2001 currency crisis in South Africa. The 
commissions report indicates variables, which may contribute to the explanation of cur-
rency crises in South Africa. Some of them are already included in standard set of vari-
ables, such as the open forward position of the SARB which is reflected in the interna-
tional liquidity position. Additionally, from this report variable (14), the inflation differ-
ential to the US is included. Other “weak” factors found to explain part of the 2001 de-
preciation, such as privatizations and negative sentiments could not be included due to a 
lack of computable data. Additionally, another factor mentioned in the literature as ex-
plaining factor to currency crises in South Africa (15) the change of the price of gold is 
included.28 
January 1993 to the latest available data is the period of observation. Using more current 
data follows that strand of literature which uses data from 1990s onwards only. The use 
of this time period is also justified by the general change in the nature of currency crises 
and the opening of the capital account in the 1990s in South Africa. The paper uses 
monthly data; if monthly data is not applicable monthly time series are constructed by 
averaging weekly data or by interpolating moving averages from quarterly data. All data 
is sign-adjusted, in order to generate time series indicating increasing pressure when 
their value rises. Data sources are predominantly the SARB or the Federal Reserve Bank 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US. A 24-months crisis window is chosen in the 
analysis and an 18-months crisis window is used to test for the robustness of the result. 
Data from up to August 2004 is used for the calculation of the noise-to-signal ratio, 
since it is unknown whether the time after that date may be followed by a crisis or not. 
(1) As industrial production variable the growth rate of gross value added at basic 
prices of secondary sector (KBP6633D) is used and monthly data is generated by 
                                                 
28  E.g. Aron, Muellbauer (2005, p. 30).  
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interpolation. The measure shows a minimal noise-to-signal ratio at a threshold 
of 25 percent, which takes a value of 2.32. Thus, industrial production sends 
more false alarms than good signals and is not considered in the composite in-
dex. 
(2) The ratio of budget deficits to GDP (KBP4420K) is constructed by interpolation 
from quarterly data and a calculation of the annual change. The indicator shows 
some more good than false signals; the noise-to-signal ratio is 0.90. 
(3) The appreciation of the real exchange rate is measured as annual change of real 
effective exchange rate of the rand consistently, excl. Zimbabwe (KBP5367M). 
The measure shows the lowest noise-to-signal ratio at the 30 percent threshold 
and takes a value of 2.08, which signifies that the measure is not a useful indica-
tor. 
(4) The change in the international liquidity position (KBP5339M) is a good indica-
tor with a minimal noise-to-signal ratio of 0.12 at the 5 percent threshold. 
(5) The growth rate of merchandise exports (KBP5000K) is calculated by interpola-
tion from quarterly data and sends just one good signal at the 30 percent thresh-
old. The noise-to-signal ratio of 36.0 is out of reach for any use as indicator. It 
was expected that falling exports increase the probability of a crisis, since inves-
tors may expect problems in serving foreign debt if exports earnings shrink and 
withdraw. 
(6) Also the growth rate of merchandise imports (KBP5003K) is calculated by inter-
polation from monthly data. At a 25 percent threshold the noise-to-signal ratio is 
0.44,  showing  that  rising  imports  are  a  good  indicator  for  currency crises in 
South Africa. 
(7) The growth rate of the ratio of domestic credit to GDP is calculated from credit 
extension (KBP1368M) and interpolated GDP (KBP6006K) figures. The mini-
mal noise-to-signal ratio of 0.68, at a threshold of 30 percent, shows that the 
variable is a good indicator for currency crises. 
(8) The growth rate of the ratio of M2 to currency reserves is calculated from M2 
(KBP1373M), gold and other foreign reserves (KBP5806M), and the US$ ex-
change rate (KBP5339M). The minimal noise-to-signal ratio of 2.77 shows this 
not to be a useful indicator. 
(9) The change in the domestic interest rate is calculated by subtracting the inflation 
rate (KBP7032A) from the interpolated discount rate on 91 days treasury bills 
(KBP1405W). The indicator produces some more good than bad signal; the ratio 
is 0.97 at a threshold of 10 percent.  
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(10) The interest rate differential to the US is calculated be subtracting the inflation 
corrected discount rate on three months US treasury bills from the domestic in-
terest rate. The variable is not indicating currency crises properly; the noise-to-
signal ratio is 2.63 at the 30 percent threshold. 
(11) The growth rate of bank deposits is calculated by the use of bank deposits of 
resident individuals (KBP1148M). The indicator is useful, showing a ratio of 
0.54 at the 5 percent threshold. 
(12) The growth rate of foreign debt of the government is calculated from the total 
foreign  debt  of  central  government  denominated  in  foreign  currencies 
(KBP4451M) time series. The indicator shows more good than bad signals, 
with a ratio of 0.65 at the 30 percent threshold. 
(13) The ratio of lending to deposit rates is calculated by dividing interest rates on 
mortgage loans (KBP2012M) by the interest rate on one year fixed deposits 
(KBP2007M). The measure sent slightly more bad than good signals with a ra-
tio of 1.09 and is therefore no indicator for currency crises. 
(14) The inflation differential to the US is calculated by subtracting US inflation 
rates from changes in the South African consumer price index (KBP7032A). 
The noise-to-signal ratio of 1.84 indicates that the variable is not an appropriate 
indicator for currency crises. 
(15) Changes  in  the  gold  price  are  calculated  from  London  gold  price  in  US$ 
(KBP5357M). As expected, the change in gold price is a good indicator for cur-
rency crises in South Africa showing a minimal noise-to-signal ratio of 0.14 at 
the 10 percent threshold. 
The noise-to-signal ratios of all variables are summarized in figure 8. 
In sum, eight indicators are left for calculating the composite index. As stated above, the 
area outlying the one-sided confidence interval is halved to calculate the second thresh-
olds. Using equation (5), first and second threshold signals are generated from each in-
dicator. Then the moving time windows for each indicator are calculated (equation (6)) 
and the Z-values of the indicators according to their inverse noise-to-signal ratio are ag-
gregated to derive a composite indicator (equation (7)). The result is displayed in figure 9. 
The dots on the line highlight the crises months.  
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Figure 8: 
























Source: own calculations. 
Figure 9: 

























































































































































































Source: Own calculations. 
 
While the index itself can be used to observe changes in the intensity of currency crisis 
signals, the level of the index cannot be interpreted. Thus, it is not possible to draw in-
ferences  on  the  probability  of  currency  crises  from  the  index.  Therefore,  following 
Brüggemann & Linne (2002) and Edison (2000) conditional probabilities for currency 
crises are calculated:  
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For each interval between a lower and an upper limit (in our case intervals of 10) the 
conditional probability is calculated. This conditional probability is the probability of a 
crisis occurring within 24 months under the condition that the indicator ranges between 
the lower and the upper band. The conditional probabilities are reported in table 2. 
Table 2: 
Conditional probabilities of currency crises in South Africa 
Interval  0-10  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  Unconditional 
Probability  0.17  0.52  0.60  0.83  1  0.57 
Source: Own calculations. 
For example, the probability of a currency crisis is 0.83 if the index shows a value of be-
tween 30 and 40, which is well above the general probability of a currency crisis to oc-
cur following any month of the sample (0.57). Figure 10 shows a graph where the prob-
abilities are attributed to the respective months. 
Figure 10: 
























































































































































































Source: own calculations. Note: dotted line shows unconditional probability. 
To test for the robustness of the composite indicator of currency crises, as derived by the 
signals approach, the procedure is repeated for the case of an 18-months time window. 
The noise-to-signal ratios are reported in figure 11. Notable is the change in the relevant 
indicators. Only six indicators sending more positive than false signals are left, credit to 
GDP and bank deposits are not considered in the 18-months case.  
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Figure 11: 























Source: Own calculations. 
The respective composite index is shown in figure 12. 
Figure 12: 


























































































































































































Source: Own calculations. 
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The conditional probabilities for the 18-months time window case are shown in figure 13. 
Figure 13: 
























































































































































































Source: Own calculations. Note: Dotted line shows unconditional probability. 
While some difference between the composite indices and the respective conditional 
probabilities can be observed, the general picture remains the same after changing the 
time window. While the index provides indications of the 1996 and in particular the 
1998 crises, it fails to clearly indicate 2001 as a crisis. For the time after 2001 there ex-
ists no indication of extraordinary risk of currency crises. However, as the figure of the 
unconditional probabilities for currency crises shows, the overall risk that any month of 
the period of observation is followed by a crisis within 24 or 18 months is 0.57 or 0.43 
respectively. Thus, the risk of currency crises is there and the change in policy in South 
Africa resulted in less indicated crisis probability due to less risk or to lesser indication 
of risk.  
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6  Conclusions 
The evaluation of the risk of currency crises in South Africa by the use of a signals ap-
proach, considering the crises episodes of 1996, 1998 and 2001 as reference, indicates 
low current risk for currency crises. The approach leads to a correct prediction of the 
currency crises of 1996 and 1998, but fails to predict the currency crisis of 2001. The 
changing nature of currency crises and the change in exchange rate policy of the SARB 
suggest that crises of the 2001-type are more likely to occur in future than crises of the 
1996/1998-type. The crisis indicator, as developed above, must therefore be treated with 
caution and should be updated permanently. A shift in the period of observation can lead 
to the detection of new crises, previously not considered as crises and also to a failure of 
detecting events previously called a crises. The changing volatility of potential signal 
variables may lead to different signal thresholds and to the inclusion or exclusion of 
variables in the composite index and may therefore change not only the index itself but 
also the calculated conditional probabilities of crises. Further research on South African 
currency crisis risk should also consider the use of other methods as has been mentioned 
in section 4.  
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EMP method including exchange rates 
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